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Brass v. State, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 68 (December 27, 2012)
1
 
 
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – BATSON CHALLENGES  
& SUFFICIENCY-OF-EVIDENCE    
 
Summary 
 
 An appeal addressing whether a district court committed reversible error by dismissing a 
prospective juror before conducting a Batson
2
 hearing, and whether there was evidence to 
support a kidnapping conviction.  
 
Disposition 
 
 The Court held that when a defendant asserts a Batson violation, it is a structural error to 
dismiss the challenged juror prior to conducting the Batson hearing because it constitutes a 
predetermination of the challenge before actually hearing it. Further, the Court concluded the 
insufficiency-of-evidence argument pertaining to the kidnapping conviction had no merit.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In January 2009, Ernest Mitchell accused his brother in law, appellant Jermaine Brass,  
and Jermaine’s wife, Katrinna, of breaking into his home and stealing his recently purchased 
tires and rims. Jermaine denied the accusation. 
 The day following the burglary, Jermaine’s brother Ronnie Brass went to the victim’s 
home. Katrinna answered the door, with Ernest following behind her to confront Ronnie. The 
argument continued outside where Ronnie made a gesture with his hands at which point an 
unidentified man appeared and shot Ernest several times, killing him. Katrinna testified that the 
shooter’s face was covered, but his voice and complexion were consistent with Jermaine’s. 
Jermaine and Ronnie were charged with (1) burglary, (2) grand larceny, (3) conspiracy to 
commit kidnapping, (4) first-degree kidnapping, (5) conspiracy to commit murder, and (6) 
murder with the use of a deadly weapon.  
 During voir dire, the defendant objected to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge 
against prospective juror no. 173, noting she was the second African American stricken. Defense 
counsel argued this peremptory challenge was based on race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky.
3
 
The district court permanently excused no. 173 prior to holding a hearing. The district court then 
conducted a Batson hearing and concluded the State had race-neutral reasons for its peremptory 
challenges, denying the defense’s Batson challenge. Jermaine was found guilty on all six counts.   
 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Douglas wrote the opinion, with Justices Gibbons and Parraguirre concurring. 
 
I. Jermaine’s claim of discriminatory jury selection 
                                                        
1
 By Joseph Sakai  
2
 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
3
 Id.  
  
 The Court affords great deference to the district court’s determination of whether there 
has been discriminatory intent in the exercise of peremptory challenges when reviewing a Batson 
challenge.
4
 Discriminatory jury selection that violates Batson constitutes structural error,
5
 which 
necessitates automatic reversal because such error is “intrinsically harmful.”6  
The use of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner is a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause,
7
 and the Court uses a three-step Batson analysis to determine if there 
has been such a violation.
8
 First, the opponent to the challenge must set forth a prima facie case 
of racial discrimination.
9
 Next, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to 
proffer a race neutral explanation for the challenge.
10
 Finally, if a race-neutral explanation is 
tendered, the trial court decides whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 
discrimination.
11
 The proponent of the strike “must give a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ 
explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges” and those reasons must be 
“related to the particular case.”12 A legitimate reason is one that does not deny equal protection.13  
In the case at hand the district court dismissed prospective juror no. 173 prior to a hearing 
to determine if the State had race-neutral reasons for its challenges. The Court held that in so 
doing the defendants were afforded no adequate opportunity to respond to the State’s race-
neutral reasons or to show pretext, due to the permanent excusal of no. 173 before a Batson 
hearing. This dismissal prior to a hearing had the same effect as a racially discriminatory 
peremptory challenge because the defendants would be left with limited recourse even if they 
could prove purposeful discrimination. This discriminatory jury selection constituted a structural 
error intrinsically harmful to the framework of the trial, therefore the Court reversed.
14
  
 
II. Jermaine’s claim of insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping conviction 
 The Court, in reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, determines 
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
15
 The 
jury’s verdict will stand when there is substantial evidence supporting it.16  
 In Nevada a person is guilty of first-degree kidnapping if that person willfully “inveigles, 
[or] entices . . . a person by any means whatsoever . . . for the purpose of killing the person or 
inflicting substantial bodily harm upon the person . . . .”17 The Court held the record reflected a 
specific plan on the part of the appellant to lure Ernest out of his home to shoot him. Justice 
Douglas concluded the insufficiency-of-evidence argument had not merit because a rational jury 
could find that Jermaine had willfully enticed Ernest from his home to kill him.  
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Justice Gibbons’ Concurrence 
 
 Justice Gibbons, agreeing with the majority, stated that political affiliation is not a proper 
component as a basis for asserting a challenge to a juror in response to the State’s striking an 
African-American juror because she was a registered Democrat.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded, based on the 
structural error related to the Batson challenge. The insufficiency-of-evidence argument was 
ruled to have no merit.  
